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INNOCENT JUVENILE CONFESSIONS 
SETH P. WAXMAN* 
You’re sixteen years old.  You like WrestleMania, animals, and 
videogames.  But you don’t like talking to people, and in fact, you try not to 
be around them whenever you can.  Because getting words out is really 
difficult, and you can’t follow what other people are saying with their words 
or their faces.  You’re in special-education classes at school, and tests have 
shown that you’re borderline disabled. 
Things got really bad when your uncle was arrested for a murder that 
everyone has been talking about.  Just a few days after he’s arrested, the 
police talk to you.  But nothing happens until a few months later, after your 
cousin says that you’ve been acting up.  So, the police bring you back in for 
three different interviews in one day, and on the next day, they take you out 
of school for another interview. 
The detectives aren’t acting tough, which makes you feel better.  They 
tell you that they’re on your side—one even says that he has a kid your age.  
They’re telling you all kinds of stuff about the murder, stuff that you did and 
that your uncle did, but they’re also quizzing you on it.  And they’re acting 
upset when you don’t get the right answer. 
So, you just guess and guess until you get it right, because you don’t 
like quizzes and it’s better if you get the right answers so you can leave.  After 
you’ve been sitting with the detectives forever, they tell you all the stuff that 
you’ve admitted to.  All the right answers you’ve given.  And you agree with 
them, because you really just want to leave and get back to school in time for 
your sixth-period class.  You’ve got a project due then.  But you don’t get to 
leave.  You’re arrested, and you’re scared, and you’re really confused, telling 
your mom that the detectives had gotten to your head.  And because you 
agreed with those things about helping your uncle with the murder, you’re 
put in jail for the rest of your life. 
 
 *  Seth Waxman is a partner at WilmerHale and former Solicitor General of the United 
States. The author offered these remarks as the Keynote Address at the 2019 Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology Symposium. The author gratefully acknowledges the 
considerable assistance of Marguerite Colson and Alan Schoenfeld. 
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Millions of Americans are familiar with the story of Brendan Dassey.  
They’ve watched his wrenching videotaped interrogation.  In a lot of ways, 
his confession is as comprehensible as it is heartbreaking.  Meaning, it’s 
understandable, maybe even unsurprising, that an adolescent with severe 
social and intellectual limitations, who is subjected to hours of two-on-one 
interrogations with no lawyer, no parent, no support of any sort, would 
confess to something he didn’t do. 
But we know that false confessions don’t come only from people like 
Brendan, people with intellectual and social limitations or people with no real 
conception of the legal system or their rights. 
Take Marty Tankleff, an affluent teenager who wakes up on what’s 
supposed to be his first day of senior year to find his mother dead—she’s 
been slashed and bludgeoned—and his father bleeding heavily in his home 
office.  Immediately he calls 911 and begins to administer first aid to his 
father.  When the police arrive, Marty identifies the likely suspect—his 
father’s business partner who had run up a half-million-dollar debt to his 
father, had recently threatened his parents, and had been at the Tankleff home 
late the night before. 
Police take Marty to the station, where they tell him that they’ve found 
forensic evidence linking him to the crime—his hair on his mother’s body.  
Eventually, one of the detectives leaves the room.  And when he returns, he 
lies to Marty, telling him that his father had woken up from a coma and 
accused his son of murdering his mother.  In fact, his father had never woken 
up and eventually died from his injuries. 
What’s Marty’s response to the detective’s lie?  He asks, “Could I have 
blacked out and done it?  Could I be possessed?”  One of the detectives tells 
him, “I think that’s what happened to you.”  So Marty confesses, recanting 
almost immediately and refusing to sign the partial confession the detectives 
had prepared.  Marty is convicted of murdering both his parents anyway, 
sentenced to 50 years to life in prison.  By the time he was exonerated, he 
had spent one-half of his life in prison. 
Stories like Marty’s are piling up—accounts of people subjected to 
psychological coercion who falsely confess to a crime, only to be exonerated 
years later.  Reaching adolescents and adults, the poor and the affluent, the 
disabled and the high-functioning, these stories raise a critical question: how 
could we have accepted their confessions as proof of their guilt? 
The answer may be as simple as the steadfast belief held by many—
including lawyers, law enforcement officials, and judges—that people who 
are innocent just don’t confess.  One of the prosecutors spoke that very line 
to the jury that convicted Brendan Dassey. 
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If innocent people don’t confess, the reasoning goes, there can be no 
better evidence of a suspect’s guilt than his own confession.  Understood this 
way, confessions assume totemic significance in our criminal justice system, 
exerting what Professor Lackey calls an “illegitimate swamping effect.”1  
That effect, she says, “overpowers” all other evidence, including later denials 
of guilt, and even DNA evidence.  The Supreme Court itself has remarked 
that “[a] confession is like no other evidence” in the profound impact it has 
on a jury.2 
Confessions also have a cascade effect.  One who makes a false 
confession is four times more likely to plead guilty rather than face trial, a 
decision doubtlessly driven by a fear that a jury simply won’t look past the 
confession.  And the cascade effect reaches other suspects as well.  With one 
false confession, police are often able to obtain false confessions from other 
suspects in the same case.  The names and the numbers are notorious.  The 
“Marquette Four,” the “Englewood Four,” the “Central Park Five,” and the 
“Dixmoor Five.” 
In the case of the Dixmoor Five, police interrogated Robert Veal, 
fifteen-years-old and mentally disabled, about the rape and murder of a 
teenage girl.  Veal falsely confessed and implicated Robert Taylor, also 
fifteen.  So, then Taylor confessed, and the police charged Veal, Taylor, and 
three other teenage boys with the crime.  Veal and another pled guilty, 
agreeing to testify against Taylor and the two other boys in exchange for 
shorter sentences.  By the time of trial, DNA evidence had eliminated each 
member of the Dixmoor Five as a possible perpetrator, yet the jury convicted 
all three boys and each was sentenced to at least eighty years.  To say these 
names—Dixmoor Five, Marquette Four—is to demonstrate the force of a 
false confession. 
Behind these stories is a mountain of social science explaining why—
contrary to popular belief—innocent people do confess.  Take perhaps the 
most obvious factor, age.  Simply put, young people think differently than 
adults.  The brain’s prefrontal cortex, which is essential to developing certain 
cognitive functions—like foresight, cost-benefit assessment, and making 
decisions that require thinking about multiple sources of information at 
once—does not develop until late in adolescence.  Unable fully to appreciate 
the long-term consequences of their actions and unfamiliar with the legal 
system, children and teenagers are more likely to confess in exchange for 
 
 1 Kathleen McGarvey, Philosopher Jennifer Lackey on Why We’re So Apt to Believe 
Confessions, U. ROCHESTER NEWSCENTER (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.rochester.edu/news
center/false-confessions-philosopher-jennifer-lackey-humanities-center-361172/ [https://per
ma.cc/2JRJ-996A]. 
 2 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). 
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what they think will be an immediate benefit, like ending an interrogation, 
going back home or, in Brendan’s case, getting back to class.  In a particularly 
distressing example, sixteen-year-old Nga Truong confessed to killing her 
infant son.  Upon being told that she would be arrested, she asked, “Is it going 
to be more than a day?” 
Development of the prefrontal cortex also relates to the way we perceive 
time.  Children experience intervals of time as lasting longer than adults do.  
So, an interrogation lasting a few hours might feel interminable to a young 
person, prompting a false confession. 
We also know that young people are more susceptible to leading 
questions than adults are.  That means they’re more apt to absorb the 
information fed to them during questioning and, in the words of Brandon 
Garrett, to “internalize that narrative and repeat it, possibly becoming 
convinced of [their] own guilt.”3  Just think about Marty Tankleff.  After the 
detective lied and told him his father had implicated him in murdering his 
mother, Marty asked, “Could I have blacked out and done it?” 
Finally, we know that young people are more vulnerable than adults to 
outside pressure and influence, particularly from authority figures.  Positive 
feedback from interrogators can elicit false confessions, and the opposite is 
true as well—children and teens succumb more easily to negative feedback.  
These physiological and psychological attributes of youth help explain why, 
looking back at the false confession he gave as a barely literate fourteen-year-
old, Davontae Sanford described wanting “everything to be right . . . because 
if it wasn’t right he wasn’t going to believe me and he would keep me longer.  
I really wanted to go home.”  Or, in the words of Marty Tankleff, “It’s like 
having an 18-wheeler driving on your chest. And you believe that the only 
way to get that weight off your chest is to tell the police whatever they want 
to hear.” 
Age aside, we know that people with social and intellectual deficits also 
are more prone to confess falsely.  They’re often unable to comprehend or 
communicate quickly enough to counter detectives’ interrogation techniques.  
And they frequently lack a basic understanding of legal rights, processes, and 
consequences.  Like young people, those with cognitive and social deficits 
are more inclined to try to appease authority figures, and they are also more 
suggestible to leading questions. 
It’s easy to see how certain typical interrogation tactics that may exert 
particular influence on vulnerable populations would have the potential to 
extract false confessions from adults as well.  Consider the tactic of 
 
 3 Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1064 
(2010). 
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minimization, which involves understating the harm or the consequences of 
a crime.  If you’re led to believe that admitting to the crime won’t carry 
particularly severe consequences and is the fastest ticket out of an 
interrogation, then why not confess, even if falsely?  There’s also 
maximization, which involves intimidating a suspect into confessing by 
overstating the nature of the crime and the proof against the subject.  Fact 
feeding and leading questions have the potential to warp a suspect’s version 
of truth and cause him or her to adopt an inaccurate version of events. 
The psychological and physiological factors I’ve just mentioned 
contribute to some pretty startling statistics.  Law enforcement officers have 
estimated that false confessions are obtained in 10% of all interrogations.  In 
the past thirty years, 353 people in the U.S. have been exonerated based on 
DNA evidence.  And nearly 30% of those exonerations involved false 
confessions.  Of 125 cases of proven false confessions in the U.S. between 
1971 and 2002, eighty-one were murder cases, and of course those cases 
usually carry the highest sentences.  One study looking at 873 exoneration 
cases over twenty-three years found false confessions in approximately 15% 
of the cases.  That percentage spiked to over 40% for juveniles. 
One would think—or hope—that the growing body of social science 
research on false confessions, along with these pretty startling statistics, 
would spur courts to address the problem.  Unfortunately, that’s not been the 
case.  After getting out in front of the issue early, the Supreme Court has been 
largely silent for the past forty years. 
All the way back in 1884, the Supreme Court gave credence to the 
notion that a confession had to be voluntary in order to be admissible, 
declaring in Hopt v. Utah4 and cases in the following few years that an 
involuntary confession should not go to the jury.  Those early cases invoked 
the common law tradition of excluding involuntary confessions as unreliable, 
but cases that followed cast the issue in a constitutional light, holding that 
such confessions violated both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The Court was also very early to recognize the particular problems that 
attend juvenile confessions.  Over seventy years ago, in Haley v. Ohio, the 
Court observed that events that might “leave a man cold and unimpressed” 
could “overawe and overwhelm a lad.”5  In view of the impressionability that 
comes with youth, the Court required “special care” in scrutinizing the 
confession of a child. 6  And almost sixty years ago, the Court invalidated the 
confession of a fourteen-year-old boy who, after confessing almost 
 
 4 110 U.S. 574 (1884). 
 5 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948). 
 6 Id. 
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immediately upon arrest, was then held in isolation for five days before 
signing the confession that would support his conviction.7 That the boy’s 
confession had come “tumbling out” didn’t matter, and certainly, the Court 
said, it didn’t make the confession constitutional.  In invalidating his 
conviction, the Court made clear that youth was a “crucial” factor in 
considering the voluntariness of a confession. 
Five years later, the Court articulated an even stronger standard, stating 
that “the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was 
voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also 
that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy or 
fright or despair.”8 
Finally, in 1979, the Court said in Fare v. Michael C. that in the case of 
a juvenile confession, the totality-of-the-circumstances test requires inquiry 
into the minor’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.9 
Fare was the last we’ve heard from the Supreme Court on the issue of 
juvenile confessions, even though in the forty years that have elapsed, the 
Court has relied on social science research to reassess youth and intellectual 
disability in other criminal justice contexts.  For example, the Supreme Court 
has held that a sentence of life without parole is unconstitutional if it fails to 
take into consideration an adolescent’s “chronological age and its hallmark 
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate 
risks and consequences.”10  And the Court has also outlawed the death 
sentence for crimes committed by people under eighteen.11 
When it comes to juvenile confessions, the Court’s silence is 
problematic not only because we would like prevailing caselaw on the topic 
to reflect the evolving science behind involuntary confessions.  The silence 
is problematic because it has also permitted lower courts to be derelict in 
enforcing the “greatest care” standard. 
With the dearth of recent cases from the Court, I had hoped the Justices 
would see Brendan’s petition as a perfect opportunity to bring the law and 
the lower courts in line with the reality of involuntary juvenile confessions.  
Brendan’s was the rare case where his interrogation and confession were 
videotaped.  There was no dispute about what was said, what tactics were or 
were not used.  His failure to grasp the magnitude of the situation is on full 
view, as is his struggle to correctly answer the detectives’ leading questions.  
 
 7 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
 8 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (emphasis added). 
 9 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
 10 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012). 
 11 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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Perhaps most important, in Brendan’s case, his confession was the only thing 
linking him to the crime.  No DNA evidence linked him to the murder of 
Teresa Halbach.  No witnesses put him there. 
Unfortunately, the Court denied Brendan’s petition.  It’s hard for me to 
recall an outcome in all my decades of law practice that has troubled me more 
than the failure to get Brendan merits consideration in the Supreme Court.  
We may never know whether the denial of certiorari signaled a lack of 
interest in updating the juvenile voluntariness doctrine or something else.  
But it’s my hope for Brendan and for many others like him that petitioners 
continue to seek cert on this issue.  The voluntariness doctrine is simply too 
consequential to lie fallow. 
As I see it, how we update the doctrine depends on what we’re trying to 
achieve.  Why do we value confessions and what values do they reflect?  We 
want justice for victims, and deterrence of and retribution for criminal 
conduct.  But as a first principle, we are trying to achieve fundamental 
fairness in our criminal justice system. 
That basic concept transcends guilt or innocence, and as the Supreme 
Court has said, it demands that we discard involuntary confessions even when 
there is corroborating evidence of the confessor’s guilt.  It offends 
fundamental fairness for a government actor to extract a confession by 
physical or psychological force.  A fair criminal justice system requires that 
a confession be the product of free will and rational intellect. 
Of course, we are searching for truth.  True confessions are reliable 
confessions, and there is no doubt that reliability and voluntariness are 
inextricably related.  In the case of Brendan, the officers’ coercive tactics and 
his own vulnerabilities resulted in a confession that was not simply 
involuntary.  It was also internally incoherent and belied by the evidence at 
the crime scene.  Truth is an end in itself.  But it’s also important for the 
simple reason that unreliable or untrue confessions mean that the actual 
perpetrator may still be at large. 
Voluntary confessions are also emblematic of the sort of accountability 
that is crucial to any ordered society.  Government actors, the people who 
take the confession, should themselves be compelled to live within the law. 
Finally, for those who think confessions contain cathartic value and are 
a step toward repentance and remorse, those things are of course demeaned 
by involuntary confessions. 
Now, I’ve just ticked through some high-minded concepts.  The 
operative question is how to implement those concepts in practice, in the 
interrogation room.  I won’t presume to prescribe best practices, because 
unlike many of the panelists today, who will no doubt share their studied 
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views on how to improve interrogations and ensure that confessions are 
voluntary, I’m no expert. 
I’ll just say, based on my experience over many decades, that it’s clear 
we cannot accept a one-size-fits-all approach to interrogations.  Detectives 
cannot assume—cannot be permitted to assume— that the same tactics used 
on socially and intellectually sound adults are safe or appropriate for use on 
young people or those with impairments. 
I look forward to hearing about how today’s panelists have been 
thinking about the problem of involuntary confessions and what solutions 
they might propose.  With that, I’ll just say thank you to Northwestern’s 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology and to the Center on Wrongful 
Convictions.  It’s a privilege to be here. 
 
